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ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF 
THE CIVIL MONEY PENALTY: SOME PRACTICAL AND 
LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
By David W. Marshall* 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent controversy over man's efforts to protect and improve his 
environment has centered around the problem of priorities. Specifi-
cally, this country has been forced to balance economic and environ-
mental considerations in order to determine how much environmen-
tal protection it can afford consistent with competing problems of 
inflation, unemployment, and energy production. Even were a 
proper level of environmental protection agreed upon, however, 
there is little assurance that it could be attained. To date, the most 
frequently used methods of implementing environmental policies 
have been largely ineffective. Neither injunctions nor criminal 
sanctions have proven to be effective deterrents to polluters. At-
tempts to internalize pollution costs have been frustrated by the 
inability to quantify those costs. 
The thesis of this article is that the civil money penaltyl may well 
provide a technique that will prove to be an effective means of 
enforcing environmental laws and implementing their policies. The 
civil penalty has been employed by the federal government! and 
many states3 to aid in the enforcement of environmental laws only 
recently, and the efficacy of the sanction has not yet been meaning-
fully tested.' The federal government, however, has utilized the civil 
penalty in other fields for some time.s Recently, the Administrative 
Conference of the United States recommended that civil penalties 
be more extensively employed by federal agencies to enable them 
to more effectively pursue their statutory goals.· 
This article will first review some of the methods presently em-
ployed to implement environmental policies, discussing the general 
nature, strengths and weaknesses of each.7 It should be noted that 
this discussion is based primarily on the theoretical nature of the 
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various techniques. Practical problems, such as insufficient agency 
funding, manpower, expertise, commitment, or freedom from politi-
cal pressures, will greatly influence the efficacy of any technique. 
The role of the civil money penalty in environmental policy imple-
mentation will then be discussed, as will various factors which relate 
to its intelligent and efficient use. Lastly, this article will examine 
two important constitutional issues surrounding the imposition of 
the civil money penalty: does the imposition of a civil penalty by 
an administrative agency violate the separation of powers doctrine, 
and is such a .penalty actually criminal rather than civil in nature? 
Confusion over these questions is believed to be the major obstacle 
to widespread and effective use of the civil penalty in the enforce-
ment of environmental laws.8 
I. PRESENT METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
Environmental policies may be implemented by schemes de-
signed either to reduce pollution from current levels by directly 
regulating the amount discharged, or to shift the cost of pollution 
from society to the polluter himself by requiring him to pay for the 
environmental damage that he causes. The most desirable systems 
will tend to accomplish both goals. 
A. Cost Internalization 
The economist views pollution not as a societal or moral wrong, 
but as an economic problem.8 In economic terms pollution is the 
result of economic dislocations which can best be remedied by a 
properly functioning market system. Such dislocations have oc-
curred because air and waterJraditionally have been treated as free 
disposal systems. The polluter has not borne the cost of his waste 
disposal, but has passed it on to other users of the air and water. 
As a result, the price of the polluter's product does not reflect its 
true cost to society. Such unreflected costs are generally referred to 
as "external costs." From an economic standpoint, a polluter will 
abate his discharges only when it costs less to do so than to pollute. 
As long as pollution costs are external, there is no incentive for the 
emitter to reduce his pollution. Furthermore, in a free market econ-
omy there is an economic disincentive to the assumption of these 
external costs through pollution abatement. Inclusion of waste dis-
posal costs would cause the abater's production costs and product 
prices to be greater than those of his non-abating competitors, who 
would continue to pass on their pollution costs to the rest of so-
ciety.to 
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To remedy these problems, a system is needed that will "internal-
ize" pollution costs (i. e., include them in the polluter's production 
costs and product prices). The goal of such a system should be the 
internalization of waste disposal costs, rather than environmental 
protection as such. Of course, the two goals are interrelated, and the 
achievement of one most often would aid in the achievement of the 
other. Where internalization occurs, the real costs of industrial 
wastes to society will be accounted for in the prices of goods pro-
duced by polluting processes. As "made with pollution" goods rise 
in price to reflect their higher costs, demand for such goods, and 
subsequently supply, will decrease and less pollution will result. 
Theoretically, pollution will decrease to the level where the mar-
ginal cost of further abatement measures is equal to the marginal 
cost of environmental damage avoided. At this level the total cost 
that society must bear for its wastes will be minimized. ll Although 
various methods have attempted to achieve such internalization, 
none have yet been successful. 
1. The Private Damage Suit: 
Probably the oldest attempt to shift the cost of pollution from 
society to the polluter is embodied in the damage suit for a private 
nuisance. The damage suit should be encouraged, since it directly 
compensates the injured party. It should not, however, be relied 
upon as a major means of internalizing pollution costs. As the time, 
cost, and effort required to conduct such a suit are usually beyond 
the resources of most individual citizens, the remedy is not fre-
quently utilized. 12 The resources of the state are needed to effec-
tively reallocate pollution costs. 
2. Emission Charges: 
A program which is theoretically capable of fully internalizing 
pollution costs is the emission charge system. Under such a system, 
the appropriate environmental authority will calculate the damage 
done by the emission of incremental amounts of pollutants and 
assess a corresponding fee against the emitter .13 For administrative 
convenience, this might be done by means of a fee schedule rather 
than by individual assessment. Under this system a polluter might 
monitor his own discharge rates, calculate what his pollution bill 
would be for the various rates, and then choose the rate which would 
cost him the least in terms of both abatement costs and emission 
charges. 
Such a system has much theoretical appeal. It is capable of shift-
ing the cost of pollution from society to the polluter and his custom-
ers. Management, rather than government officials, would bear 
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much of the burden of investigation and decision-making. The sys-
tem would not set uniformly applicable pollution abatement stan-
dards or procedures, but would allow management to choose the 
best solutions to its individual pollution problems. The lack of emis-
sion standards would also provide a continuing incentive to search 
for a way to abate discharges beyond the level which might have 
been set as an emission standard. 14 The fees collected might also be 
used to finance governmental abatement efforts. I. 
From a practical standpoint, there are two primary methods by 
which the effluent charge system might be implemented. Charges 
might be based on the damage done to the environment,16 or they 
might be based on the cost required to treat the discharged waste 
and return it to an environmentally neutral state.17 Unfortunately, 
neither method is as yet feasible. 
Charges based on environmental damages are impractical mainly 
because currently there is not sufficient data to permit an accurate 
measurement of such damage. Without an accurate determination 
of environmental damage as a function of pollutant discharge rates, 
the fee schedule would be rather arbitrary.ls Cost internalization 
will not be achieved, and the pollution levels determined by the 
interaction of the market and the fees will not represent minimum 
cost levels. Furthermore, the difficulty of relating damages to dis-
charges will require an extensive governmental decision-making sys-
tem, vastly reducing the theoretical efficiency of the emission 
charge system. IS 
A system based on treatment costs also suffers from serious defi-
ciencies. It is totally inapplicable to airborne emissions, as there is 
no known way to clean the air once it is past the stack outlet. The 
treatment approach is better suited to water pollution, although 
problems still exist. First, the water pollutants may cause environ-
mental damage before they reach the treatment facility. Further-
more, it is highly doubtful that current methods of water treatment 
clean the water sufficiently to prevent environmental damage fur-
ther downstream.20 Finally, it is extremely difficult to allocate to 
individual polluters their respective share of the total treatment 
cost attaching to an affected water basin.21 
Until these problems are solved, neither method of emission 
charges will represent a feasible system of internalizing pollution 
costs. At this time, therefore, direct methods to reduce pollution 
should be favored. Although the sanctions and regulations pre-
scribed by these methods may possibly be too stringent-forcing the 
polluter to pay more in abatement costs than society gains from 
increased environmental quality-it appears that presently the cost 
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of property damages and personal injury from pollution is much 
greater than amounts devoted to its abatement. 22 The more likely 
danger appears to be that the measures will not be stringent enough. 
B. Environmental Protection 
Consistent with the above reasoning, the usual goal of environ-
mental laws has been the reduction of environmental pollution to 
an acceptable level and maintenance of this level. To accomplish 
this goal of environmental protection, a certain level of air or water 
quality is legislatively or administratively determined. 23 In most air 
pollution control schemes, maximum allowable discharge rates are 
then set for various industries to facilitate the achievement of the 
chosen environmental quality level. 24 Under water pollution control 
programs, every polluter is required to obtain a discharge permit, 
which fixes the maximum allowable rates at which he may dis-
charge various pollutants.25 The rates prescribed in the permit are 
generally based on industry performance standards, but may be 
varied according to individualized factors such as the location, pres-
ent degree of pollution, and amount of flow of the accepting body 
of water. Under both the air and water programs, the polluter will 
monitor his own discharge rates and report them to the environmen-
tal enforcement agency, which may initially and occasionally there-
after visit the polluter's plant to verify the reported rates.26 If the 
polluter violates any applicable emission standards or any condi-
tions of his discharge permit, he may be enjoined from continuing 
such violations or subjected to various civil and criminal penalties.27 
It should be noted that the above discussion is generally applica-
ble to the continuous type of discharge. Some pollutants, however, 
are considered a great enough hazard that no discharge is permitted. 
In such a case the typical violation will be a non-continuous dis-
charge, such as an oil spill. 28 Such violations generally are neither 
foreseeable nor easily preventable. Therefore, the response to this 
type of violation should focus on compensation rather than deter-
rence. 
1. The Injunction: 
The injunction directly focuses on the prevention of future pollu-
tion, avoiding the inflexibility of some other sanctions that look to 
punishment of past acts. In dealing with future acts, a court may 
develop the best course of action by balancing the various equities 
in light of the public policy issues involved. Injunctive relief may 
thus be tailored to bring a polluter into compliance with environ-
mental laws over a period of time, where the situation so warrants.29 
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It may also be used to compel a violator to cease illegal discharges 
immediately, where the threat to the public is severe and immedi-
ate, or where all other enforcement attempts have failed. 
Use of the injunction, however, is subject to important limita-
tions. Obviously, it is inapplicable to those violations which have 
already occurred or are not expected to recur. Although its flexibil-
ity allows individualized approaches to specific problems, use of the 
injunction should not unduly involve the courts in the legislation of 
environmental policy. Similarly, courts should be reluctant to in-
volve themselves in the management decisions of those they enjoin. 
Implementation of a court abatement order usually will be better 
supervised by management or by a specialized administrative 
agency. 
Unlike other regulatory sanctions, the injunction prevents pollu-
tion only by prohibiting it in specific instances. An injunction can 
operate as a deterrent only where it may be used to close down a 
polluter's operation. In the vast majority of cases, the polluter need 
not fear such a shutdown, as a court rarely utilizes this sanction in 
the absence of a severe, immediate, and proven health threat. The 
reluctance of courts to order a plant shutdown is understandable, 
as the expense to society of such a shutdown may often be greater 
than the environmental benefits to be realized. 
These problems are graphically illustrated by several recent 
cases. In Reserve Mining Co. v. United States,30 a large industrial 
plant which was central to the economy of an entire region was 
discharging taconite tailings from its operations into adjacent Lake 
Superior. The United States District Court for the District of Min-
nesota found a serious health threat, and ordered Reserve to imme-
diately cease all discharges into the lake.3' The Eighth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, considering a motion to stay the District Court's injunc-
tion, found small likelihood of an eventual showing of a substantial 
health threat, and due to the great economic impact of an immedi-
ate shutdown on Reserve, its 3000 employees, their families, and 
their communities, granted the stay. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement 
CO.,32 the New York Court of Appeals was faced with a similar 
situation. A large cement plant was emitting dust and raw materials 
into the air, causing property damage to nearby landowners. The 
court denied an immediate injunction, choosing instead to grant an 
injunction to be vacated on the payment of permanent damages to 
the landowners. This denial was partially based on the court's belief 
that it should not attempt to legislate and implement a policy for 
the elimination of air pollution. The court also felt that the substan-
tial benefit which the plant gave to the region's economy out-
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weighed the injury complained of, which was to property rather 
than health. In both cases, although the defendant was causing 
serious pollution problems, the appellate court found an injunction 
to be inappropriate. The important factors in each decision were the 
economic importance of the defendant's activity and the legislative 
nature of the judicial action required. 
Some environmental statutes provide for the revocation of operat-
ing licenses or pollution discharge permits for violations of permit 
conditions or emission standards.33 Permit or license revocation, of 
course, has the same effect as an injunction-it forces a polluter to 
close down. Although this all-or-nothing type of sanction may be 
appropriate in cases of particularly hazardous or flagrant violations, 
it is often likely to cause more damage to society than it prevents. 
2. Criminal Sanctions: 
Criminal sanctions traditionally have been used to deter anti-
social conduct, including that detrimental to the environment. Un-
fortunately, such sanctions have been generally ineffective in reduc-
ing violations of environmental protection laws.34 The major defect 
in a system of criminal sanctions used to enforce environmental laws 
is conceptual. The subject matter of these and other health and 
safety laws is considered to be malum prohibitum. The prohibited 
act is a crime not because it is considered morally wrong, but merely 
because it has been declared unlawful.35 Therefore, the real deter-
rent value of the criminal sanction, the stigma of moral blame, is 
greatly reduced.38 
The second difficulty is more practical. A great amount of unlaw-
ful pollution is caused by corporations which, of course, cannot be 
imprisoned. A monetary fine can only be effective where it is greater 
than the cost of compliance. When imposed, however, criminal fines 
have been very small, and have effected no real deterrence.37 An-
other type of penalty is to prohibit "environmental violators from 
receiving government contracts or other benefits, such as grants or 
loans.38 This sanction might be best employed against municipali-
ties by conditioning state and federal aid on compliance with envi-
ronmentallaws. Unfortunately, the sanction cannot affect the many 
polluters who do not depend significantly on such benefits. 
An alternative to fixing liability upon the corporation itself is to 
hold responsible an individual within it. The immediate actors, 
however, are usually lower echelon employees, who are merely 
carrying out the orders of the higher policy makers ultimately re-
sponsible for the violation.39 It is extremely difficult to pinpoint the 
officials responsible for the policy or decision which leads to the 
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violation, and courts have been very reluctant to do SO.40 Because 
of this reluctance and the difficulty of proving criminal intent be-
yond a reasonable doubt, some environmental laws have reduced 
the accountability problem by making negligent omission, or simply 
omission, the basis of liability. 41 
In practice, these problems have rendered the criminal sanction 
ineffective as a means to enforce environmental laws. Without the 
usual requirement of criminal intent, and without any attachment 
of moral culpability to the unlawful act, administrators and prose-
cutors are reluctant to invok~ criminal sanctions, jurors are reluc-
tant to find guilt, and judges are reluctant to impose strong penal-
ties.'2 Because most violators are businessmen, such tendencies are 
only reinforced. Businessmen violating environmental laws are 
often viewed as acting merely in the respectable pursuit of profit. 
In any case, they are not generally thought of as criminals, and 
society is hesitant to so brand them. 43 The same phenomenon occurs 
in cases in which municipalities and the elected officials who run 
them are responsible for pollution. 
The substantive problems with the use of criminal sanctions are 
exacerbated by procedural drawbacks. For a money penalty to be 
an effective deterrent, the procedure for its imposition and collec-
tion must be as speedy as is consistent with protection of the defen-
dant's procedural rights. The polluter must be forced to assume his 
costs when they are incurred, and should not be allowed to defer 
them. Such speed is not possible in a criminal prosecution. Gener-
ally, courts are slow and overcrowded," and streamlined adminis-
trative procedures are unavailable for constitutional reasons.'5 The 
many procedural safeguards,48 which are largely inappropriate in 
environmental money penalty cases,47 only serve to further lengthen 
the criminal proceeding. 
Thus, where no criminal intent is required, jury nullification and 
related problems cripple the efficacy of the criminal sanction. The 
sanction is appropriate, however, in cases involving demonstrably 
intentional, wanton, or reckless violations. Here, some measure of 
moral culpability is involved and the sanction may act as an effec-
tive deterrant.48 
3. The Civil Penalty: 
A civil penalty is simply a monetary sum that is assessed and 
recovered in a civil proceeding for a violation of law. Although the 
civil penalty may be viewed as a sanction in the sense that it is 
imposed to produce obedience to environmental laws," it is not 
designed to punish the violator. Its purpose is deterrence or compen-
CIVIL MONEY PENALTY 331 
sation, not retribution.50 It is not designed as a revenue measure, 
although the money collected might be used to finance the govern-
ment's environmental protection efforts. Rather, the primary objec-
tive is to avoid collection of the penalty by inducing the polluter to 
abate excessive emissions.51 An alternative rationale for the civil 
penalty is compensation to society in the form of liquidated dam-
ages for the environmental harm caused by the violation. This alter-
native rationale is particularly suited to fortuitous, one-time dis-
charges, where the deterrent effect of the penalty may be relatively 
insignificant. 
Briefly, the civil penalty functions as follows. If a polluter violates 
applicable emission standards or permit conditions, he will be liable 
to pay a money penalty to the state in a civil action brought by 
either the attorney general or the environmental enforcement 
agency. The legislature may fix the amount of the penalty to be 
imposed in any given situation,52 or it may prescribe the limits of 
the penalty, leaving the administering agency or the court with 
discretion to fix the amount in individual cases.53 To insure that the 
civil penalty will deter a polluter from discharging wastes at exces-
sive rates, its amount must be greater than the violator's compli-
ance or abatement cost. 54 As with any sanction, it is also important 
that enforcement be uniform, swift, and certain. 
The greatest attribute of the civil penalty is its effectiveness in a 
wide variety of situations where neither injunctions nor criminal 
sanctions are appropriate. 55 It may function as a deterrent in cases 
where an injunction cannot. Thus, where it is not in the public 
interest to enjoin the entire operation of a plant which is important 
to the local economy, the civil penalty is the more appropriate rem-
edy. The threat of the penalty would act as a deterrent or at least 
as a disincentive to further discharges. Should the penalty become 
necessary, it would more accurately reflect a balancing of societal 
interests. In situations such as the above, where the enforcement 
authority currently has only the choice of no remedy or a drastically 
harsh one, the Administrative Conference of the United States has 
recommended use of the civil money penalty. 58 
Except in the case of intentional, wanton, or reckless violations, 
a civil penalty has distinct advantages over a criminal sanction. 
Since the civil penalty effects deterrence by the use of economic 
disincentive rather than by fixation of moral blame, it avoids the 
problems inherent in the use of criminal sanctions to prevent acts 
such as pollution which are not considered morally culpable. Fur-
thermore, imposition of a civil penalty avoids subjecting the of-
fender to the stigma of a lifetime criminal record for conduct which 
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he may not have known was wrongful. 57 
The economic effect of the civil penalty may best be illustrated 
by its comparison with a theoretical variation of the pure emission 
charge system discussed previously. This variation acts primarily as 
a deterrent to excessive pollution, rather than as a cost internaliza-
tion device.58 Such deterrence would be accomplished by setting the 
fee schedule according to a polluter's abatement cost instead of the 
environmental damage caused. Although the two emission charge 
systems are similar in form, the above variation will be referred to 
as "emission deterrence charges." 
The civil penalty is directly analogous to this emission deterrence 
charge. In both cases the optimal level of environmental quality is 
determined by the government rather than the market. Specific 
emission standards are then set to facilitate achievement of this 
level. Where the civil penalty is used, the standards are directly set 
by the government. Violations of these standards are enforced by 
the imposition of civil penalties. In the emission deterrence charge 
system, the government would indirectly determine the emission 
standards through the setting of a fee schedule. Although the pollu-
ter would make the decision as to how much waste he can afford to 
discharge, the fees would ideally be set to make the governmentally 
desired discharge rates his least-cost choice. This would be done by 
making payment of fees for emissions in excess of the desired stan-
dard more costly than abatement. Thus, under one system, exces-
sive emissions would cost the violator a "civil penalty," and under 
the other, an "emission deterrence charge."59 As the penalties or fees 
are set to achieve the optimum level of environmental quality, they 
have the potential to incidentally approximate environmental dam-
age and thus aid in the internalization of pollution costs. It should 
be recognized, however, that the penalties as set are not direct ap-
proximations of environmental damages, but are economic deter-
rents to excessive pollution discharges. 
The two systems, however, do have important differences. The 
civil penalty, as it now exists, is not a true equivalent of an emission 
deterrence charge, as factors other than abatement cost enter into 
the determination of the amount of the penalty. Another important 
difference is that the civil penalty is a much more direct method of 
environmental. quality enforcement. Despite these differences, the 
civil penalty and the emission deterrence charge are very similar, 
and one may probably be used as effectively as the other. In view 
of growing federal and state acceptance of the civil penalty,eO how-
ever, it may be wiser to stay with the civil penalty, at least until a 
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clearly superior and feasible emission charge system can be devel-
oped. 
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE EFFICACY OF THE CIVIL MONEY PENALTY 
To assure that the theoretical efficiency and flexibility of the civil 
money penalty is realized, criteria used to determine the amount of 
the penalty and procedures for its imposition must be carefully 
selected. The following sections will discuss the relative merits of 
the various criteria and imposition procedures available. 
A. Criteria Used to Determine the Amount of the Penalty 
In prescribing a civil money penalty, the legislature must provide 
the adjudicatory body with a framework for determining the sever-
ity of the penalty in a given case. It should prescribe both a mini-
mum and a maximum penalty for the violation in question. The 
minimum should function to deter polluters from smaller, non-
trivial violations, but should not be so large as to cause administra-
tors and courts to hesitate to impose it. On the other hand, the 
maximum penalty must be sufficiently substantial to exceed the 
cost of compliance of the largest polluters.81 The proper basis on 
which to impose the penalty must also be selected. As most air and 
water pollution violations are repetitive, a per diem penalty is much 
more desirable than a per violation penalty. A per diem penalty 
helps to deter continuing violations by allowing sums to accumulate 
over time. The penalty more closely approximates the cost of abate-
ment and thus acts as a superior deterrent. 62 
To protect against arbitrary imposition of the penalty, the legisla-
ture should provide the adjudicatory body with criteria to guide it 
in setting the amount, as well as the upper and lower limits, of the 
penalty. In cases of continuous discharges, the critical guideline 
necessary to insure real deterrence is that the penalty exceed the 
cost of pollution abatement. 63 A second basis for computing the 
penalty is the damage to the environment caused by the violation.64 
The employment of this basis may help to shift the cost of pollution 
from society to the polluter in cases where the environmental dam-
age is susceptible of approximation, but any deterrence depends 
upon the relation of the polluter's cost of abatement to the amount 
of environmental damage caused. It may be useful, however, to 
portray the civil penalty in some cases as a form of liquidated dam-
ages. This rationale is particularly appropriate in cases of non-
repetitive violations, such as oil SpillS.65 The penalty's predominant 
function here is not deterrence, but rather compensation for the 
harm caused to society. 
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A third criterion involves the ability of the polluter to pay either 
the penalty or the full cost of compliance.66 It may be a better policy 
to assess a penalty that the violator can afford, and hope that he 
will attempt to comply to the extent that his resources allowY From 
a broader perspective, however, it may be unwise to subsidize mar-
ginal operators whose pollution rates are relatively high as a result 
of antiquated and inefficient facilities. In addition, expenditures 
made by the polluter in compliance or clean-up efforts should be 
considered in mitigating the penalty. 68 Such efforts are not only 
evidence of a violator's good faith, but also represent a voluntary 
partial internalization of pollution costs by the violator. For the 
same reasons, some states now provide for the remission of all or 
part of the penalty if the polluter promptly corrects the violation.69 
This position is commendable as it induces compliance after the 
penalty is collected, and helps to emphasize that the primary pur-
pose of the civil money penalty is to improve the quality of the 
environment, not to punish the violator. 
Unfortunately, other criteria have been used which tend to pro-
duce the opposite effect. For instance, the amount of care exercised 
by the violator is sometimes considered in computing the penalty.70 
In the case of a continuous violation, the consideration of due care, 
apart from expenditures made in attempted compliance, goes to the 
violator's moral culpability and is more properly reserved for a crim-
inal prosecution.71 Other statutes penalize the violator who has a 
past record of violations.72 It may be argued that the increase of a 
penalty on the basis of past violations, which theoretically have 
been "paid for," can only be interpreted as punishment.73 Some 
environmental statutes possess the drawback that a penalty cannot 
be assessed for statutory or regulatory violations which occur prior 
to the issuance of a cease and desist order.74 Such a penalty will have 
negligible deterrent value compared to one that may be assessed 
commencing with the day that the polluter first receives notice of 
the violation.75 Cease and desist orders should not function so as to 
allow the violator to escape responsibility for his harmful waste 
discharges until such time as the government orders him to stop 
violating the law.76 
B. Methods of Imposition and Collection of the Penalty 
The flexibility, and thus the efficacy, of a civil money penalty is 
profoundly affected by the choice of procedure used in assessing and 
collecting the penalty. Two basic types of procedure have been uti-
lized most frequently. They may be designated as judicial imposi-
tion and administrative imposition. 
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A number of state statutes provide for the judicial imposition of 
environmental civil money penalties.77 This is the least flexible of 
possible procedures. The appropriate enforcement agency will first 
make its assessment of the defendant's liability for the violation of 
an environmental statute, rule, regulation, standard, or order. The 
agency must then bring a civil action in court seeking the imposition 
of whatever penalty is provided by statute.78 The court has complete 
discretion as to whether or not to impose any penalty, and of the 
amount of any penalty it chooses to impose. Under a slight variation 
of this procedure, the agency may determine the defendant's "ap-
parent liability" and fix the amount of the penalty. The defendant, 
however, has the right to a de novo trial on both the merits and the 
amount of the penalty.79 
A more flexible procedure is administrative imposition of civil 
penalties.80 Here. the agency determines liability and fixes the 
amount of the penalty in an administrative hearing. The defendant 
is entitled to judicial review,81 which is essentially ,limited to a deter-
mination of whether the agency's action, with respect to both the 
defendant's liability and the amount of the penalty, is supported by 
substantial evidence;82 and is neither an abuse of discretion nor an 
error of law.83 If the defendant does not seek such review and does 
not pay the penalty, the agency may either enforce the penalty as 
if it were a court judgment,84 or it may have to institute a stream-
lined collection proceeding in the courts where the issues of the 
defendant's liability and the reasonableness of the penalty may not 
be raised.85 
A variation of the administrative imposition procedure described 
above is employed in several states.88 It is similar to the above proce-
dure in that the agency determines both the defendant's liability 
and the amount of the penalty assessed. Here, however, if the defen-
dant does not voluntarily pay the penalty, the agency must institute 
a court proceeding to compel payment, at which the defendant is 
entitled to limited judicial review of the agency's actionY The only 
real difference in the two administrative imposition procedures is a 
shift in the burden of "appeal" from the defendant to the agency.88 
The difference between this second administrative procedure and 
judicially imposed penalties is much more significant. Instead of a 
de novo trial on the merits, the defendant is entitled to only a 
limited form of judicial review.89 
The main advantages of the judicially imposed penalty are that 
it is more familiar to enforcement institutions and it is clearly con-
stitutional, avoiding some of the legal questions which might arise 
when an administrative agency performs tasks of a legislative or 
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judicial nature. 90 The judicial imposition system, however, lacks 
much of the flexibility that makes the civil penalty a desirable 
sanction. 
In order for the civil penalty to be an effective economic deterrent, 
penalty cases must be adjudicated quickly, efficiently, and at rela-
tively low cost. This is possible only under an administrative impo-
sition system. Under judicial imposition, speedy adjudication of 
violations and imposition of penalties is impossible because court 
procedures, which are necessarily slow, are required.9! Furthermore, 
the courts are already overloaded and might have difficulty han-
dling the strain which a system of environmental civil penalties 
would impose.92 The severity of this strain would be enhanced by 
two factors. First, environmental litigation is typically lengthy and 
complex.83 Also, the number of cases added to the docket would be 
large, as the assessment of a civil penalty would be appropriate and 
necessary for the majority of environmental violations. 
An extensive evaluation of how the system of court imposed pen-
alties has functioned on the federal level has recently been con-
ducted for the Administrative Conference of the United States by 
Associate Professor Harvey Goldschmid of the Columbia University 
School of Law'" The severe problems encountered by the federal 
agencies with this system are partially manifested in the greater 
than 90% settlement rate that these agencies have experienced. 95 
Although there is nothing wrong with settlements per se, under the 
judicial imposition procedure settlements are usually of such poor 
quality that the penalty loses all real deterrent value.B8 This hap-
pens because the agencies tend to settle for "what the traffic will 
bear," rather than for what is appropriate from the standpoint of 
effective enforcement policy. Since the courts are overburdened and 
the cost of court litigation may well exceed the amount-of the pen-
alty assessed, the agency often accepts meager settlements, believ-
ing it has no other choice. These circumstances particularly favor 
the large corporation which can more easily afford to contest the 
agency action, knowing that if a settlement is not reached, the 
agency may not be able or willing to go to court.97 
Under the administrative imposition system, artificially low set-
tlements which do not reflect sound enforcement policy will be 
avoided by eliminating the pressures created by the unavailability 
of overburdened courts or the high cost of utilizing them.98 Further-
more, there will be no opportunity for wealthy violators, who might 
refuse to settle under a judicial imposition system, to evade assump-
tion of their pollution costS.89 
CIVIL MONEY PENALTY 337 
Another drawback inherent in the system of judicially imposed 
penalties is that judges often do not possess the technical compe-
tence required to effectively administer a system of environmental 
civil penalties. 1M More effective enforcement may be provided by 
administrative agencies, which are able to specialize in a particular 
field and may employ a staff of expert personnel. An agency is also 
better suited to administer the penalties in a consistent fashion 
pursuant to a specific policy, providing a fairer system and one 
capable of greater deterrence. 
As with other governmental actions dealing with the rights of 
private parties, due process should be the governing standard. Es-
sentially this requires only that the defendant receive a fair and 
impartial hearing, which need not be before a court. A defendant is 
just as likely to receive a fair hearing before an administrative 
agency, particularly because he has the right to judicial review of 
the agency action. lol Specific safeguards should include adequate 
notice, right to counsel, opportunity to answer charges through the 
presentation of evidence and cross-examination of witnesses, and 
the publication of agency findings and reasoning in order to preserve 
a reviewable record for the appellate court}O! The standard of judi-
cial review should allow inquiry into whether errors of law have 
occurred, whether the agency has abused its discretion, and whether 
agency findings are supported by substantial evidence. 
Some of the problems inherent in the judicial imposition system 
may be mitigated by statutes which allow the agency to recover, 
through the penalty action, reasonable costs and expenses in detect-
ing, controlling, and abating pollution violations,103 and by statutes 
which allow the agency to recover the penalty in an action brought 
to obtain an injunction. UN Furthermore, judicial imposition of civil 
penalties will be more effective in states where there is little or no 
court backlog, and in cases where the penalties sought are large. lOS 
Despite these mitigating factors, the use of judicially imposed civil 
penalties in the enforcement of environmental laws possesses seri-
ous shortcomings, and it is submitted that administrative proce-
dures are much more appropriate for imposition of civil penalties. 1M 
m. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE CIVIL MONEY 
PENALTY 
In view of the advantages offered by the administrative procedure 
of imposing civil money penalties, it seems puzzling that so many 
state environmental statutes have provided for the judicial imposi-
tion procedure. The reason seems to be that many states have 
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viewed the procedure of judicial imposition as a safe and sure way 
to assure the legality of the civil penalty by avoiding "constitutional 
doubts" about administrative imposition.lo7 These doubts have cen-
tered around two related questions. Does the administrative imposi-
tion of variable civil money penalties violate the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, and are the penalties actually criminal rather than 
civil in nature? 
A. The Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The doctrine of separation of powers has been implied from the 
United States Constitutionlo8 and is expressly provided for in most 
state constitutions. lOB The following is a typical statement of the 
doctrine as found in many state constitutions: 
The powers of the government sha:ll be divided among three distinct 
branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons 
belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers 
properly belonging to any of the others, except as expressly provided in 
this constitution. no 
The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent the tyranny and loss of 
civil liberties that would result from the concentration of govern-
mental power in one person or body}ll Therefore, the manifest 
objective of the doctrine is to maintain the balance of power be-
tween the three branches of government. H2 The doctrine was never 
intended to be strictly interpreted as requiring rigid classification 
and compartmentalization of all governmental action as either leg-
islative, executive, or judicial. If courts had so construed it, the very 
existence of an administrative agency would beunconstitutional. H3 
Since governmental powers have not been scrupulously separated, 
but have always overlapped to some extent, the determination of 
whether a power is "legislative," "executive," or "judicial" cannot 
be made by seeking the inherent nature of the power.1l4 Therefore, 
the similarity in form of legislative or judicial procedure to adminis-
trative rule-making or adjudicatory procedure is not determinative 
of possible constitutional deficiencies. ll5 As Professor Davis has 
stated: "The danger is not blended power. The danger is unchecked 
power. "He 
Much of the case law is consistent with this view of the separation 
doctrine. It is well settled that a legislature may lawfully delegate 
to an administrative body the power to make rules and regulations, 
as long as the legislature sets forth sufficiently specific standards to 
indicate to the agency the limits of the power delegated. ll7 Accord-
ing to Professor Davis, 118 the current law is in agreement with 
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Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,119 where the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
Delegation by Congress has long been recognized as necessary in order 
that the exertion of legislative power does not become a futility. . . 
[T]he effectiveness of both the legislative and administrative processes 
would become endangered if Congress were under the constitutional 
compulsion of filling in the details beyond the liberal prescription here. 
Then the burdens of minutiae would be apt to clog the administration 
of law and deprive the agency of that flexibility and dispatch which are 
its salient features. l20 
Thus courts have often paid little more than lip service to the "suffi-
cient standards" rule, 121 and have upheld statutes which provide 
very broad standardsl22 or none at all. 123 Courts have generally recog-
nized that as society becomes more complex, the requirement of 
rigid and detailed legislative standards is unrealistic and counter-
productive.124 It is therefore not surprising that courts have consis-
tently upheld environmental and public health laws which grant 
broad authority to an administrative agency to promulgate rules, 
regulations, and emission standards. 125 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that adjudicatory 
powers to conduct hearings and issue orders may be conferred upon 
administrative agencies. 128 The real danger of arbitrary agency 
power here is that the defendant may be denied due process through 
the lack of a fair and impartial hearing. Thus, modern cases have 
tended to examine the sufficiency of the procedural safeguards and 
the availability of judicial review more carefully than the specificity 
of legislative standards. 127 Where adequate review and safeguards 
are available, courts generally have allowed delegation of quasi-
judiciaP28 powers to administrative agencies. 129 
To enhance the effectiveness of administrative rule-making and 
adjudicatory powers, they must be backed by sanctions. The courts 
have recognized this fact and have held that the legislature may 
provide penalties collectible in a court proceeding for violations of 
administratively promulgated rules, regulations, and orders. In 
United States v. Grimaud,130 the United States Supreme Court re-
jected the contention that such a procedure unlawfully delegated 
power to the administrator to create new crimes. 131 The state deci-
sions are in general accord with Grimaud. 132 Thus, there is no doubt 
that judicial imposition of civil penalties for the violation of envi-
ronmental statutes, rules, regulations, or orders is constitutionally 
permissible. 
Once it is accepted that an administrative agency may perform 
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adjudicatory and rule-making functions pursuant to its grant of 
power from the legislature, the question whether the agency may 
validly be granted the power to assess civil money penalties comes 
into sharper focus. As other forms of delegation are permissible, it 
would seem that the power to impose money penalties might also 
be validly delegated to an agency. Such, however, has not always 
been the case. 
It has been accepted since Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. 
Stranahanl33 that a civil money penalty fixed in amount by the 
legislature may be imposed by an administrative agency. In that 
case the United States Supreme Court upheld an immigration stat-
ute which allowed the Secretary of Labor to impose a $100 penalty 
if he determined that a statutory violation had occurred. In rejecting 
the defendant's claim that the penalty could be imposed only by the 
judicial process, the Court held that the plenary power of Congress 
over the admission of aliens included the power to enact statutes 
pursuant to that power, to provide penalties for violations thereof, 
and to delegate to an administrator the authority to impose such 
penalties. Significantly, the Court rejected the argument that ad-
ministrative imposition would necessarily lead to abuse!?, stating 
that it was incorrect to assume that only courts may safely be en-
trusted with power. In Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azoni 
v. Elting,l34 the Supreme Court, in upholding the same statute with 
a ten-fold increase in the penalty, made it clear that it was more 
concerned with the fairness and reasonableness of the penalty impo-
sition procedure than with the amount of the penalty,135 
It may be inferred from federal decisions that Congress may also 
delegate the power to impose variable penalties, allowing the ad-
ministrator to fix the amount of the penalty. 13ft In N. A. Woodworth 
Co. v. Kavanaugh,137 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 
penalty assessed by the National War Labor Board against an em-
ployer who had made certain wage payments in violation of the 
Stabilization Act of 1942.138 By regulations adopted pursuant to the 
Act, the Board was required to consider mitigating circumstances 
in calculating the amount of the penalty. 139 Today, such a procedure 
in which an administrative agency imposes an agency-determined 
monetary penalty as a result of an agency-conducted adjudicatory 
proceeding is an accepted feature of many federal enforcement 
schemes.14o 
State courts, however, have not always upheld the administrative 
imposition of variable civil money penalties. Although most courts 
have interpreted the separation doctrine as allowing administrative 
bodies to utilize non-monetary penalties to effectuate general statu-
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tory policy, some courts have balked at the administrative use of 
variable monetary penalties. 14I The courts of at least four states 
have held that delegation of the power to impose a civil money 
penalty and fix its amount violates the separation of powers doc-
trine. '42 Furthermore, decisions in two other states cast some doubt 
on their acceptance of such a procedure. '43 The majority of states, 
however, have upheld the administrative imposition of civil penal-
ties in one form or another. 144 
The reasoning in the few cases striking down administrative im-
position schemes has been rather divergent. In State ex rei. Lanier 
v. Vines,'45 the North Carolina Supreme Court was faced with an 
insurance statute authorizing the Commissioner of Insurance, at his 
discretion, to deal with statutory violations by the assessment of 
civil penalties not exceeding $25,000 per violation and by the sus-
pension or revocation of an insurance agent's license. The court 
interpreted the state constitution as prohibiting administrators 
from being vested with power of a judicial nature unless it was 
"reasonbly necessary as an incident to the accomplishment of the 
purposes for which" the Department of Insurance was created. '46 
The court found that this provision applied as well to quasi-judicial 
powers, as the constitution provided that all judicial power, not just 
supreme judicial power, shall be vested in the courts. The court held 
that the power to revoke or suspend an agent's license was "reasona-
bly necessary" to protect the public from fraudulent activities by an 
agent and clearly within constitutional bounds. Without explana-
tion, however, the court then held that the seemingly lesser power 
to impose civil money penalties was not reasonably necessary and 
therefore unconstitutional. 
It may be forcefully argued that there is no material constitu-
tional difference between license revocation or suspension and the 
imposition of money penalties. License revocation may be in many 
circumstances an excessive penalty which does not further the pub-
lic interest. Very possibly, the legislature felt that in such situations 
money penalties would be "reasonably necessary" to effectuate the 
Commissioner's statutory purpose, because such penalties would 
provide him with a more effective and flexible sanctioning tool. 147 In 
any event, it is doubtful that the Vines reasoning will seriously 
affect environmental civil penalties. In an environmental context, 
where the effect of revoking a permit might be to close down a 
factory, causing unemployment and other economic problems, the 
civil money penalty would appear to meet the requirement of rea-
sonable necessity. 
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In Broadhead v. Managhan, \48 the Mississippi Supreme Court 
invalidated a statutory provision allowing the State Tax Commis-
sioner at his discretion to impose a penalty of between 10% and 25% 
for delinquency in payment of any income tax installment. The 
court held this provision to be an unconstitutional attempt to dele-
gate legislative power to an administrative body. The court relied 
not upon the uniqueness of its constitutional separation of powers 
provision, but upon case law from other jurisdictions, particularly 
a Utah decision which was overruled sub silentio two years later.149 
The court found that to allow the commissioner to fix the amount 
of penalties for violations of law without adequate statutory stand-
ards for guidance, would be to allow the delegation of "unrestricted 
power."I50 Provision of a fair and impartial administrative hearing, 
along with the right of a court hearing on the merits, was held 
insufficient to save the statute. 
Other courts have also focused on the sufficiency of legislative 
standards in scrutinizing administratively imposed civil penalties, 
but have applied the test much less strictly.151 For example, in 
County Council v. Investors Funding Corporation,152 the Maryland 
Court of Appeals extensively discussed the separation of powers 
doctrine. The act in question established a commission which was 
vested with various enforcement powers, including the power to 
award money damages to an injured party and the power to impose 
civil penalties not to exceed $1000 per violation. The act's enforce-
ment provisions were challenged as vesting in an administrative 
body judicial powers reserved exclusively to the courts. The court 
found that the separation doctrine was designed to prevent the exer-
cise of unchecked, not merely blended, power. Therefore, adminis-
trative bodies were not prohibited from exercising power of a judi-
cial nature so long as that power was not beyond check or court 
review. With the single exception of the civil money penalty, the 
enforcement procedures were upheld. With respect to the civil pen-
alty provision, the court stated: 
[I]t is readily apparent that the Commission has unrestricted, unbri-
dled discretion in fixing the amount of the penalty, within broad limits, 
up to $1000 without regard to the nature or gravity of the violation. 
While we conclude that the authority to impose a civil monetary penalty 
is not a power beyond constitutional delegation to an administrative 
agency, we think the discretion vested in the Commission to fix the 
amount of the penalty in any amount up to $1000, for any violation of 
the Act, in the absence of any legislative safeguards or standards to 
guide it in exercising its discretion, constitutes an invalid delegation of 
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legislative powers and otherwise violates due process of law require-
ments.U3 
Due to the complete lack of legislative safeguards or standards, the 
court concluded that meaningful judicial review of the commission's 
imposition of the penalties was impossible. Without such review, 
the commission's power to impose such penalties was unrestricted 
and thus unconstitutional. 
Some courts have indicated that procedural safeguards, rather 
than specific legislative standards, are the most important means 
of protection from arbitrary administrative imposition of money 
penalties. In Rody u. Hollis,t54 for instance, the Washington Su-
preme Court upheld the delegation of power to the state Human 
Rights Commission to order violators of antidiscrimination laws to 
pay monetary damages in amounts up to $1000 to the wronged 
complainant, emphasizing the importance of adequate" ... proce-
dural safeguards to control arbitrary administrative action and 
guarantee due process of law to individuals and entities affected by 
such administrative action."155 The court rejected the contention 
that this procedure constituted an invalid delegation of legislative 
power, stating that all that was needed were standards which de-
fined in general terms what was to be done and which administra-
tive body was to do it. The court further acknowleged that the power 
exercised in making awards was quasi-judicial, and to assure that 
each case was treated on an individual basis, the standards should, 
accordingly, not be too specific. 150 It felt that the statute should only 
describe the wrongful conduct, set out the normally acceptable lim-
its of the sanction, and then allow the administrative agency to 
determine the appropriate amount of the sanction "by applying 
general principles of morality and traditional concepts of justice."157 
The only state decision to date ruling on the validity of a civil 
penalty provision in an environmental statute is the recent Illinois 
case of Waukegan u. Pollution Control Board. 15s Until Waukegan, 
Reid u. Smithl59 had been considered authority in Illinois for the 
proposition that administrative imposition of a civil money penalty, 
coupled with the power to determine its amount, constituted an 
invalid conferral of judicial authority on the administrative body. 
The statute in Reid authorized the Illinois Department of Labor to 
provide a penalty of $10 per day against any state contractor for 
each employee that was not paid the "prevailing wage." The Illinois 
Supreme Court simply stated that this provision conferred judicial 
power on administrative bodies contrary to the separation of powers 
provision of the Illinois constitution. loo 
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Subsequently, the constitutional validity of Section 42 of the Illi-
nois Environmental Protection Act,161 which granted the Pollution 
Control Board authority to impose civil money penalties for statu-
tory and regulatory violations, was vigorously debated before the 
Illinois district courtS.162 Against the background of this unsettled 
debate, the district court in City of Waukegan v. Environmental 
Protec tion Agency, 163 heard the appeal from a Board order assessing 
a penalty of $1000 against the City of Waukegan and $250 each 
against two Illinois corporations pursuant to an Environmental 
Agency complaint charging various refuse violations. The district 
court, with one judge dissenting, reversed the Board's action, find-
ing the statutory civil penalty provision unconstitutional. After re-
viewing Illinois case law, the court merely stated that "the imposi-
tion of a discretionary fine is a distinctly judicial act and one that 
cannot be exercised by an administrative body."164 The vigorous 
dissenting opinion pointed out that the discretionary nature of the 
penalty was not conclusive of its unconstitutionality as an invalid 
delegation of judicial power.185 The dissent reasoned that the court's 
function was to determine whether the authority conferred on the 
agency was incidental to administering the law, whether procedural 
safeguards and limits on delegation were sufficient to preclude the 
arbitrary exercise of power by the agency, and whether the most 
essential check, meaningful judicial review of the lawfulness of the 
agency's action, was available. Finding that the Environmental Pro-
tection Act contained adequate safeguards against arbitrary agency 
action, the dissent maintained that the Act was constitutionally 
valid. 
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court ended the debate by agree-
ing with the lower court dissent and upholding the statute. 166 The 
court supported the view that the separation doctrine does not pre-
vent an administrative agency from exercising powers convention-
ally utilized by the judicial or legislative bran'ches. After a review 
of leading commentary and federal and state case law, the court 
found that the clear" ... trend in State decisions is to allow admin-
istrative agencies to impose discretionary penalties. "167 Reid was 
distinguished on the ground that the statute considered in that case 
neither defined nor furnished a standard for ascertaining the con-
duct which rendered one liable for a penalty . Furthermore, the court 
in Waukegan found that earlier Illinois decisions had upheld the 
delegation of power to administrative agencies to impose what are 
really penalties, such as the denial or revocation of a license, in cases 
where judicial review was available, and indicated that such power 
is not different from the power to impose monetary penalties. 
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Turning to the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, the court 
noted that it required notice and a public hearing at which the usual 
civil rules of evidence applied, and at which parties had the right 
to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine witnesses, and to 
exercise subpeona power. The Act also provided for judicial review 
of the findings and orders of the hearing board as to all questions of 
law and fact presented in the record. The statute contained guide-
lines for the Board in determining the amount of the civil penalty, 
including the character and degree of injury to the health, general 
welfare, and physical property of the people, the value of the pollu-
tion source, and the technical practicability and economic reasona-
bleness of reducing or eliminating the emission from the pollution 
source. The court then found that the statutory authority granted 
to the Board to impose civil penalties was reasonably necessary and 
appropriate to the accomplishment of the purpose of the statute, 
which was to provide a specialized and uniform statewide program 
of environmental enforcement. Finally, the court held that the pro-
vision of adequate judicial review, the procedural safeguards em-
bodied in the statute, and the mandatory statutory guidelines for 
the Board's imposition of civil penalties were sufficient to render the 
Environmental Protection Act valid. us 
It would appear that an administratively imposed environmental 
civil money penalty should be constitutionally acceptable in most 
states as long as adequate safeguards are provided to prevent ad-
ministrative exercise of arbitrary power and to protect the defen-
dant's right to a fair and impartial adjudicatory hearing. The legis-
lature should also provide adequate standards by fixing the limits 
of the penalty and by enumerating appropriate criteria to guide the 
agency in setting the penalty. As several courts have upheld the 
administrative award of money damages,189 it may be useful to em-
phasize the liquidated damages aspect of the civil money penalty. 
Finally, as an ultimate check against arbitrary agency power, judi-
cial review must be an integral part of every environmental civil 
money penalty scheme. 
B. The Prohibition Against Administrative Imposition of Criminal 
Penalties 
Traditionally, the power to decide guilt or innocence in a criminal 
case has been exercised exclusively by the judicial branch. 170 Al-
though court decisions invalidating administratively imposed 
money penalties have rarely characterized the penalty as criminal 
in nature,17I a close reading of these opinions reveals that the courts 
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may have actually been more concerned with the similarity of a civil 
money penalty to a criminal fine than with the separation of powers 
doctrine.172 Is the assessment of a "civil" money penalty actually 
criminal in nature and therefore solely within the jurisdiction of the 
courts? Professor Jaffe feels that the answer is clearly "no."173 The 
United States Supreme Court apparently agrees, although the law 
on the subject is rather confusing and non-definitive. 
As early as 1909 in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 174 
the Supreme Court rejected the claim that a statute authorizing the 
administrative imposition of a $100 penalty for a statutory violation 
defined a criminal act, and had impermissibly authorized an ad-
ministrative official to determine whether a crime had been com-
mitted and then to inflict "punishment." The Court relied on 
Hepner v. United States l75 in holding that a penalty may be col-
lected in a civil proceeding where the statute on its face makes clear 
that it is not intended to define and punish a crime. 
A few years later, however, in several cases dealing with Section 
35 of the National Prohibition Act,178 the Court decided that the 
penalties provided, which were recoverable in a civil action, were 
actually criminal in nature. 177 The Act provided that a person who 
illegally manufactured or sold intoxicating liquor pay a double 
"tax" plus an additional money penalty assessed by revenue officers 
and enforced by distraint. The same activity was punishable as a 
crime by fine and imprisonment. In Lipke v. Lederer,178 the Court 
found that Congress had allowed the revenue officer to assess a 
"civil" penalty for an alleged criminal act, reasoning that the pen-
alty was not truly aimed at civil violations of the tax laws, but at 
criminal violations of the prohibition laws. Since the Court decided 
that the penalty was intended to be punitive, it could not be labeled 
"civil." In finding a denial of due process, the Court relied heavily 
on the lack of provision of notice or a hearing to the defendant. 179 
In the later case of Helvering v. Mitchell,180 the Court made it 
clear that Congress may impose both criminal and civil sanctions 
for the same act or omission, impliedly rejecting any inference in 
Lipke to the contrary.18l The defendant in Helvering had been ac-
quitted of the criminal charge of wilful tax evasion but was subse-
quently assessed a deficiency plus a 50 % penalty when the Commis-
sioner found that the defendant had made fraudulent deductions 
with the intent to evade tax payment. The defendant claimed that 
this second proceeding was barred by the Fifth Amendment prohibi-
tion against double jeopardy, asserting that the 50% penalty was a 
criminal penalty imposed as punishment. The Court rejected this 
argument, finding that the penalty was remedial and free from pu-
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nitive intent, thus civil and not criminal in nature. In holding the 
penalty civil, the Court placed much weight on the clear intention 
of Congress that the penalty be civil in character.182 
Although the Court implied that the penalty could be viewed as 
a liquidated damages provision, it is more realistic to view it as a 
deterrent. l83 This, of course, does not make the penalty criminal, 
since deterrence has long played a role in civil law. 184 The Supreme 
Court recognized this in United States ex rel. Marcus u. Hess, 185 
where it stated: 
This remedy does not lose the quality of a civil action because more than 
the precise amount of so called actual damage is recovered. . . Congress 
could remain fully in the common law tradition and still provide puni-
tive damages. 186 
In upholding the penalty, however, the Court relied heavily on the 
theory that it represented liquidated damages. 187 
In One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring u. United States, 188 
the most recent Supreme Court decision on the nature of a money 
penalty, the Court has maintained the liquidated damages ration-
ale. In One Lot the defendant had been acquitted on a criminal 
charge of failing to declare imported merchandise with the intent 
to defraud the United States, whereupon the government instituted 
a civil forfeiture proceeding pursuant to statute. The Court rejected 
the defendant's claim that he was subjected to double jeopardy, 
holding the forfeiture to be a civil sanction which was intended to 
help enforce the tariff regulations. The Court also upheld the impo-
sition of a money penalty provided in the statute, finding that it was 
a remedial sanction which was a reasonable form of liquidated dam-
ages. 18B In its discussion of the reasonableness of the penalty, the 
Court indicated that a money penalty which is clearly intended to 
be civil (i. e., designated by Congress as such), is not criminal unless 
it is so excessive that its reasonableness as a regulatory sanction is 
highly suspect and thus manifests an intent that could only be 
punitive. 
This latter type of reasoning is consistent with Court decisions 
dealing with non-monetary penalties, where a sanction has been 
considered civil if it is imposed "not to punish, but to accomplish 
some other legitimate governmental purpose."IBO Thus in Fleming u. 
Nestor,IBI the Court upheld a statute that provided for termination 
of old-age benefits payable to an alien who had been deported, by 
finding that the statutory purpose was not punitive. The Court 
indicated that a finding of punitive intent would be unlikely by 
stating that "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent .. .is re-
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quired before a Congressional enactment of this kind may be struck 
down."1.2 The Court, however, retreated slightly from this state-
ment by indicating in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 183 that when 
the evidence of Congressional intent as to the penal nature of a 
statute is not conclusive, other factors must be considered. Essen-
tially this consideration amounts to determining whether the sanc-
tion is normally considered to be punishment, and whether any 
purpose other than punishment may be rationally ascertained. 184 
Under the above type of analysis, the money penalty used to aid 
in the enforcement of environmental laws should be viewed as civil 
in nature. The purpose of the penalty is to improve the quality of 
the environment by making it more costly to emit pollutants, or to 
shift the cost of pollution from society to the polluter, not to punish 
the polluter. The sanction should be viewed as an economic deter-
rent, not as retribution. Even if courts find that the penalty has 
some punitive nature, the alternative remedial purposes are ration-
ally and readily ascertainable, and the penalty is not excessive in 
view of these purposes. 
Additionally, civil money penalties imposed in the environmental 
field may be regarded as liquidated damages which compensate the 
government, and thus society, for the harm resulting from the viola-
tor's illegal discharge of pollutants. Certainly this penalty is more 
in the nature of liquidated damages than the 50 % addition assessed 
in Helvering v. Mitchell. That environmental costs are by nature 
extremely difficult to ascertain only strengthens the analogy}85 
There is very little case law dealing with the proposition that the 
environmental civil penalty is actually criminal in nature. The fed-
eral cases have dealt primarily with the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA) provision authorizing the administrative 
imposition of civil money penalties for illegal oil or chemical dis-
charges into navigable waters. 1 •• In the recent case of United States 
v. W. B. Enterprises,1'7 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York adhered to the liquidated damages 
theory of civil penalties in upholding a penalty against the claim 
that it was criminal in nature. Several other federal district courts 
have upheld the assessment of civil penalties under the same provi-
sion without any apparent misgivings.198 
In United States v. Le Beou! Towing,." however, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana recently struck down the 
FWPCA provision of criminal penalties for failure to report an ille-
gal discharge. 2M Once reported, the discharge itself would render the 
polluter liable for a civil penalty. The court found that the civil 
penalty imposed for the discharge itself was criminal enough in 
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nature to render the self-disclosure provision violative of the Fifth 
Amendment's self-incrimination prohibition. The court reasoned 
that, in effect, the FWPCA provided criminal penalties for failure 
to disclose a crime. In so holding, the court found that the true 
nature of the "civil" penalty was to punish the violator, relying 
heavily on the mandatory nature of the penalty (even though no 
minimum penalty was prescribed) and its finding that money pen-
alties have traditionally been considered criminal punishment (even 
though the two cases cited by the court in support of this finding 
clearly fail to do so). 201 
The latter finding was particularly remarkable in light of the 
Supreme Court decisions in Helvering, One Lot, and similar cases. 
The Le Beout court attempted to distinguish these cases on the 
ground that the penalty provision at bar was initiated by a self-
disclosure provision. Assuming that both the penalty for the actual 
spill and the penalty for failing to report the spill were criminal, the 
court may well have been justified in finding a Fifth Amendment 
violation. The court in Le Beout, however, assumed the distinction 
it claimed to be proving. The nature of the penalty for the discharge 
is not changed by a self-disclosure provision. Unless the penalty is 
in fact criminal in nature, the self-disclosure provision is perfectly 
valid. The Le Beout decision should not, and in all probability will 
not, be followed.202 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Legislators still appear to be searching for an effective enforce-
ment tool to aid in the implementation of environmental policy. The 
injunction is an invaluable environmental tool because of its adapt-
ability to diverse situations, but it possesses negligible deterrent 
value. Criminal sanctions may be an effective deterrent to wilful 
violations of environmental laws, but are inappropriate for the bulk 
of environmental violations, which are often due to negligence and 
are not usually considered morally culpable. The emission charge 
system has great theoretical appeal, but due to the current lack of 
necessary data on the actual costs of pollution, a workable scheme 
has not yet been devised. What is needed is a device which will 
effectively deter excessive pollution in the majority of instances 
where the polluter is not acting wilfully and the operation cannot, 
for policy reasons, be closed down. 
The civil money penalty appears to be the strongest candidate for 
the role. It combines much of the flexibility and other theoretical 
advantages of the emission charge with the familiarity and simplic-
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ity of the traditional regulatory sanction. The civil penalty operates 
on the theory that where the penalty is greater than the polluter's 
cost of abatement, the polluter will choose to comply with the law 
and abate his pollution rather than pay the penalty. The penalty is 
thus designed to reduce environmental pollution, not to punish vio-
lators. In addition, it will partially accomplish the internalization 
of pollution costs, removing the burden of these costs from the rest 
of society. 
To assure its effectiveness, the civil penalty must be administered 
in a manner calculated to achieve maximum flexibility while pro-
viding affected parties with fair and reasonable treatment. This 
flexibility must be sufficient to allow the penalty in any given case 
to be set above the polluter's abatement cost, thereby inducing 
compliance. The system should also allow the consideration of other 
factors, which, although secondary from a deterrence standpoint, 
may be desirable for various policy reasons. The degree of flexibility 
of the penalty is greatly affected by the procedure used to impose 
and collect it. Where possible, the administering agency should be 
allowed to determine the polluter's liability and fix the amount of 
the penalty. Under this procedure, a penalty may be assessed soon 
after the violation occurs and through consideration of various ap-
propriate factors may be set at the amount that will produce the 
maximum deterrence consistent with public policy and due process 
of law. The slow and inflexible procedure of judicial imposition 
should be reserved for use where state law will not allow administra-
tive imposition. 
The constitutional doubts respecting the administrative imposi-
tion of civil money penalties may be surmounted in most states by 
careful and intelligent drafting of environmental legislation. Most 
case law indicates that agencies may validly impose and fix the 
amount of civil penalties where (1) adequate statutory guidelines 
and procedural safeguards are provided, (2) the power to impose the 
penalties is incidental and reasonably necessary to the accomplish-
ment of the agency's statutory purpose, and (3) the penalty is de-
signed to function as a regulatory rather than punitive sanction. 
This view strikes a strong balance between the need for administra-
tive enforcement in our complex technological society and the dan-
ger of administrative abuse of power. Hopefully, all states will even-
tually support this viewpoint. Increased employment of the civil 
money penalty in the enforcement of our environmental protection 
laws is strongly recommended. 
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